Time to rethink the Special Relationship?

by Timothy Garden & Menzies Campbell

The British and the Americans go back a long way. Despite the violent constitutional separation of two centuries ago, the two nations remain extraordinarily close. In more recent times the special relationship has weathered differences over the early development of atomic weapons, Suez, the Vietnam war, and the Falkands. But since the end of the Cold War, the common threat, which bound the transatlantic alliance together, has all but disappeared. American military involvement in Europe has reduced despite the troubles in the Balkans. The success and continuing enlargement of the EU have made the prospect of war within Europe unimaginable. NATO looks somewhat hesitantly for a new role. Security threats are no longer from wars with neighbouring states. It is the EU which stands up to the US in matters of trade: it is the EU which acts as an equal when economic interests are threatened. Whether it is steel tariffs or farm subsidies, the UK does not fight its case alone, it takes shelter under the larger umbrella of Brussels so as to fight its cause better.

But despite all these changes, Britain still sees itself as the prime ally of the United States. Successive governments have found that the unequal partnership is worth preserving. Since the terror attacks of 11 September 2001, the relationship between the two countries has deepened further. While all of Europe was quick to declare support in the emotional days following the destruction of the World Trade Center, enthusiasm has waned as the extended war on terrorism has become less focused. Many European nations contributed to the US operation against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, but the traditional transatlantic vehicle for military co-operation, NATO, was left on the sidelines in spite of its historic declaration invoking article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The British Government virtually alone remains publicly uncritical of the mixed messages from the Bush Administration which veer from disarmament of Saddam Hussein to his replacement.

Soon after arriving in office, Tony Blair took a bold step towards a stronger strategic relationship with the rest of Europe. The Anglo-French summit at St Malo in 1998 unblocked years of British obstruction to the development of any EU based military capability. The EU, nearly as wealthy as the USA and certainly more populous, had remained nonetheless dependent for its security on the US and the latter’s disproportionate contribution to NATO. When Europe found itself with a problem on its doorstep in the Balkans, it had to turn to US military power for help. Successively in Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia, American firepower was essential to success. Europe was embarrassed, even humiliated, by its inadequacies.

In response to these shortcomings and as the conflict in Kosovo raged, efforts were being made to develop the new structures for EU military power. In Helsinki for example in 1999, the UK was at the forefront of developing the outline for a significant force which could be deployed at relatively short notice to undertake crisis management tasks. But three years on, the old UK preference for partnership with the USA has re-established itself. In the past, the importance of preserving NATO would have been used as the rationale. The need to keep Russians out and the Germans down might no longer be a justification for NATO; but keeping the Americans in would still have been a compelling objective. Yet increasingly NATO plays a much smaller role in the current assessment of our national interest. Who expects NATO to be called into battle any more? American military capability is now so far ahead in quantity and quality that it can do without the bother of consensus building within the alliance. NATO is useful as the forum for encouraging niche capabilities and force specialisations among its expanding membership as the Prague Summit eloquently illustrated. As each of the members provides a specialist capability, each develops its own special relationship and dependency with the United States. NATO’s new rapid response force will never go into action unless the USA wills it to do so. Deployment may in theory depend on consensus but it is possible to envisage Latvia, for example, exercising its theoretical veto?

For Britain, the future equipping of our armed forces is explicitly linked to their ability to work with the US military. Much of the extra defence funds provided by the Chancellor will go to provide for the network centric capabilities to plug into Defence Secretary Rumsfeld's new technologies. We can abandon the Sea Harrier organic air defence for the fleet on the assumption that if we need protection, then Uncle Sam will provide it. The corollary is that for serious operations we will only be able to put to sea when Uncle Sam says he will protect us. We buy enough cruise missiles to be able to fire a few in the middle of an American shower. Our role in EU defence is to encourage the more reluctant Europeans to sign up to the same vision of the future.

The first priority of any government is the security of its people. The cliché of Post Cold war uncertainty has become a stark reality. Any government needs to consider the options for security but with an open mind. In the last century, two world wars and the Cold War showed the benefits of shared transatlantic interests. None of these three would have been won without American resources and political will. There were differences of view between close allies, but the threats and tasks were broadly agreed.

The campaign against terrorism is a more difficult venture. The military will want to use it as a rationale for expensive high technology capabilities with global reach, suitable and sufficient to join American-led coalitions and missions. Yet the EU approach, both in development aid and in Justice and Home Affairs, may be just as important in the longer term. However desirable it may be to deal with terrorism at a distance, the threat may be much closer to home. Large spending on network centric warfare may look premature when civil defence is in such a parlous state. Balancing the demands of defence at home, offensive long-range capability, and investment in soft security has never been more important.

The EU is waiting for leadership in the field of foreign and security policy. There is no need for it to be so impotent. Its members have much in common with the US view of the world, but they also have important differences of emphases. In development aid, the EU produces more cash with fewer strings attached. In defending against terror and preventing proliferation, the EU works with the grain of the international community, and uses its own internal mechanisms to improve security. The EU has a more balanced view of the Middle East, a welcome if improbable legacy of its colonial past. Only in the field of military force, is the EU failing to meet the challenge. Yet the current membership of 15 nations fields more troops than the US, has more combat aircraft, and spends $140 billion a year between them. That they achieve so little for such investment verges on a disgrace as George Robertson has persistently and rightly tried to tell them.

Britain likes to view itself as a bridge between the US and Europe. It could fulfil that role much better as a leading architect in the development of enhanced diplomatic and military capabilities in the EU, and by promoting a European vision for global security. As the special relationship becomes more and more one of dependency, British influence in Europe at the same time is in decline. The EU could do much more to promote international peace and security. Terrorism will not be defeated purely by military action. Without a solution to the Middle East crisis, new suicide bombers will spring up as if from Dragon’s teeth. If Afghanistan returns to anarchy, because of a failure to provide funds and stability, new training camps for terrorists will appear. If Iraq is mishandled, there might be anti-western sympathy in the Muslim world for future asymmetric battles. The repository for all strategic wisdom is not necessarily found in Washington. A stronger Europe can be a partner with the United States fulfilling a joint strategy for security in which the EU and the US each bring to the partnership that which they are best at. The United Kingdom, by leading Europe, can better influence the US.

This article was written jointly with Menzies Campbell MP, who subsequently published a shorter version in the Financial Times