Relations between Britain and the US
Memorandum from Professor John Baylis, Centre for the Study of Conflict, University of Wales, Swansea (October 2001)
NEW OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES: RELATIONS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES, AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF US FOREIGN POLICY FOR UK INTERESTS
<1. Introduction: The Context
1.1 It would be wrong to say that everything has changed since September 11,
but it seems likely that the whole basis of international relations is entering
a new phase. During the Cold War the structure of world power was essentially
bipolar and, as time went on, a consensus on the "rules of the game"
gave the system some predictability and stability. During the post-cold war
era there has been more uncertainty, with a greater diffusion of power and one,
apparently impregnable, superpower, supported at times by international coalitions
of various kinds. The attacks on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon has highlighted
the vulnerability of even the United States, and has potentially changed the
whole structure of world politics. The international system is now increasingly
divided between those engaged in trying to eradicate terrorism and those involved
in, and giving support to, terrorist activities. It is clear that one of the
key questions for the future is how far the global coalition against terrorism
can hold together over the coming months and years as we move into what is likely
to be a very rocky and unpredictable period of international relations. If a
global coalition can take effective action the move towards a more co-operative
international system might be enhanced by the events of September 11. If this
is not possible then Robert Kaplan's "The Coming Anarchy" may have
arrived already. These events pose new and demanding challenges for British
diplomacy in general, and for Britain's relationship with the United States
in particular.
2. Britain's Relations with the US Prior to September 11
2.1 Undoubtedly the most important strategic element of British foreign and
defence policy since 1945 has been the continuous process of building and maintaining
the "special relationship" with the United States. As David Reynolds
has argued (and as a wide of declassified government documents show) the "special
relationship" has been a deliberate tool of diplomacy, as well as a reasonably
accurate description of Anglo-American relations since 1945, especially in the
intelligence and defence fields. The perception of officials and governments
of both political parties has been that British interests require a close and,
if possible, preferential partnership with the United States. Sentiment and
culture have played their part, but at the heart of the "special relationship"
has been the coincidence of interests between the two states and a common world
view.
2.2 In the cold war, despite occasional crises (eg Suez and Skybolt), the perception
of a common enemy was relatively easy to maintain. In the more complex post-cold
war period the challenges have been greater, but governments of both political
parties have continued to emphasise the continuing importance of close ties
in an uncertain world. The traditional conventions of being the first, and most
supportive, ally of the United States in a crisis, and not openly criticising
the US when there have been disagreements, have been maintained. There has been
a continuing belief that the US is only likely to be influenced through dialogue
with close friends who are prepared to share the burdens with the United States
in times of need.
2.3 With the new, sometimes strident, unilateralism of the Bush era the opportunities
for friction in Anglo-American relations increased. In practice, the Blair government
has worked very hard to ensure that at a personal and a practical level the
"special relationship" remains intact. Despite misgivings in some
influential quarters over NMD, the Kyoto convention, the Chemical and Weapons
convention and US Middle Eastern policies, Britain has continued the role as
America's most supportive ally.
3. The New Global Crisis
3.1 Two things were noticeable about the reaction of the Blair government in
the immediate aftermath of the attacks on September 11. Firstly, the constant
message of standing "shoulder to shoulder" with the American government
and the immediate offer of support. Secondly, the deliberate search to build
a broad international coalition within hours of the atrocity occurring. The
contentions of the past were immediately on display, Britain is, and has been
seen to be, the most supportive (and toughest) of America's allies. Britain
has been prepared to aid the US in a practical and major way in their hour of
need. Therein, officials have argued, lies the greatest opportunity to influence
the Bush administration in the dangerous period ahead.
3.2 There have been many period since the second world war when British Governments
have sought to use the "special relationship" to influence the US
when, what were perceived to be, dangerous policy options were being considered
(eg Korea, the 1950s debates about nuclear pre-emption, the Cuban Missile crisis).
It appears that similar anxieties existed in Whitehall in the immediate aftermath
of September 11. Worries about the "new unilateralism" in general,
and the apparent decline in the influence of Colin Powell, are likely to have
caused policy-makers in London to fear the prospect of the United States "lashing
out" in rage against those suspected of performing the atrocities and those
suspected of harbouring them. The message from London appears to have been that
determined, sustained and effective action must be taken but that the implications
of such action must be carefully weighed and that a global coalition against
international terrorism should be involved in the range of responses (legal,
economic, diplomatic as well as military) that would be necessary. The implication
was that strident unilateralism should have no place in the new post-September
11 era. This message appears to have reinforced a similar message from certain
parts of the US Administration.
4. British interests in the coming era
4.1 The dreadful events of September 11 have created new and very serious challenges
for British diplomacy. With hindsight, the attempts by the Blair government
to sustain and nourish the "special relationship" have been proved
correct. Through that policy and the immediate response by the Blair government,
Britain has been, and continues to be, in a unique position to try to influence
American policies. How much influence Britain will be able to exert (as in the
past) will be limited and will depend on how Britain responds to the actions
undertaken by the US in the months ahead (some of which the government may well
not agree with).
4.2 Britain would seem to have had three immediate objectives. The first was
to provide support for those in the Administration, like Colin Powell, who were
arguing for a careful, thoughtful assessment before action was taken. The second
was to continue to argue that, despite some of the operational difficulties,
maintaining a global coalition should be a key element in American strategy.
Britain has an important interest in helping to sustain a multilateral approach
to the crisis (with states making different contributions to the joint cause)
and, as Mr Blair has shown, the government is in a good position to use its
broad diplomatic expertise to try to achieve this task. The third objective
has been to argue that British experience suggests that an effective counter-terrorism
strategy requires a multi-dimensional approach, with co-ordinated economic,
financial, diplomatic, psychological and military approaches being pursued simultaneously.
In such a strategy military action has to be carefully calibrated to the broader
objectives of the campaign. The importance of the parallel campaigns of forceful
action and humanitarian support for the people of Afghanistan, in particular,
seems to have been a useful British initiative.
4.3 This said, whatever, the definition of a "proportionate" response,
military action sustained over a considerable period is likely make the task
of sustaining the global coalition extremely difficult to achieve. If significant
"collateral damage" is inflicted even the most supportive Muslim states
will find it difficult to continue their support of the US. Opposition, over
time, is also likely to emerge amongst other allies if the actions taken are
not seen to be effective. Should this happen, and the coalition begins to break
up, the danger will be that demands will grow in the UK for even more unilateral
action. The mind-set of a state at "war" might lead to tougher responses
against perceived enemies. There are already influential voices in the administration
calling for a small tight alliance of states to assist the US, rather than a
loose and potentially unreliable, broad coalition. The dilemma for the government
in such a situation will be that, given the strong commitment given to the US,
they will have to continue to stand "shoulder to shoulder" with the
Bush administration to achieve any influence, but there may be more and more
actions being undertaken unilaterally with which they (and an increasing number
of British citizens) do not approve. The fragmentation of the coalition will
clearly pose enormous dangers for the future of international security.
4.4 One of the issues preventing this from happening, and in keeping the coalition
together, will be whether the broader multi-dimensional approach to terrorism
includes significant changes in UK policies, especially those towards the Middle
East. Without a serious, sustained and balanced attempt to re-ignite the Middle
East Process the task of maintaining the involvement of moderate Muslim states
in the coalition is likely to prove difficult, if not impossible. There would
appear to be a clear British interest in reinforcing the emerging consensus
in the US that this is necessary and playing a diplomatic role, in conjunction
with the EU, in helping to overcome the very dangerous impasse which currently
exists. It should be noted that, for the moment at least, there does appear
to be some sensitivity to these issues in the US, especially with the unprecedented
talk about a Palestinian state. Britain can play an important role in sustaining
these sensitivities and what appears to be a new and very positive direction
to US policies.
4.5 Above all, British interests demand that the actions taken against the terrorist
threat are effective. US policy makers are clearly aware of the multi-dimensional
requirements of dealing with terrorism, but Britain has an important role to
play in sustaining this emphasis on a broader strategic vision in its talks
with US officials. Britain will also need to play a key role in the wide range
of legal, financial, economic, political, psychological and security measures
which will be necessary. These measures will clearly require much greater and
more effective international co-operation than has been achieved in the past.
Only time will tell if this can be achieved.
CONCLUSION
5.1 The potential for a sustained period of intense international instability
and economic crisis is clearly very considerable. While our close ties
with the United States will give us some influence over US policy-making,
past experience suggests that there is a limit to that influence. The
US government will do what it feels is in its own security interests.
5.2 It seems that the whole context of the debate about NMD, for example,
in the slightly longer term, will be very different in the aftermath of
11 September. For the moment it seems likely to move to the diplomatic
back-burner. In the medium to longer term, however, it is likely to return
to centre stage. Although NMD would be irrelevant in the face of determined
low-tech terrorist attacks, the events of 11 September, will undoubtedly
be used by supporters to argue that ballistic missile defences against
"rogue states" or terrorist groups with access to missile technology
are even more important now than they were before the attacks on the World
Trade Centre and the Pentagon. It is likely that America's allies will
be expected to see the logic of this and provide the necessary support.
Opposition or even qualified support may well be difficult to sustain.
The key issue here, however, is not so much NMD itself, but its implications
for arms control in general and the maintenance of strategic stability,
whatever form that will take in the post-11 September period. Britain
would seem to have an interest in helping to preserve an arms control
regime which reflects a new consensus on what is required to maintain
international stability. Prior to 11 September, the first tentative steps
were being taken to open a dialogue with Russia on a new concept of strategic
stability which might not be based so centrally on the ABM Treaty of 1972.
If the multilateral coalition against terrorism can be maintained, it
might make it easier to develop a consensus on a new concept of strategic
stability which reflects the changing perspectives of the major powers,
particularly those with nuclear weapons. Should the coalition fragment,
this task will clearly be more difficult, with all of the implications
for the future of international security. Britain would appear to have
an important role to play in helping to engage the United States, Russia,
China, France, India and Pakistan, as well as other members of the international
community, in a dialogue about the future of arms control and the form
a new concept of strategic stability should take. A vital part of this
policy will be to bolster support for the new interest in multilateralism
in the US. Whether this can be achieved remains far from clear at present.
5.3 In the light of Mr Blair's broad vision of what is needed to establish
a new international order (expressed at the Labour Party Conference) and
in the context of the prevailing view in Washington that "those that
are not with us are against us", British diplomacy is likely to face
important and significant challenges in the months and years ahead. Translating
the Blair doctrine into reality is going to require enormous political
skills and financial resources. Equally, influencing the US in a way that
serves these expansive British diplomatic and strategic interests is likely
to be a delicate and sensitive task.
Professor John Bayliss
Director of the Centre for the Study of Conflict, University of Wales,
Swansea
October 2001